Senior U.S. military commanders bypassed warnings in critical databases that intelligence about potential targets in Iran was severely outdated, approving strikes—including one that hit a school in Minab, killing nearly 200 children and adults—according to three sources familiar with the decision-making process.
The warnings, embedded in the Pentagon’s targeting systems, indicated the intelligence was based on years-old data that required re-vetting. The decision to ignore these alerts was made for “expediency” as commanders rushed to provide targets at the start of the war, two sources said. This directly contributed to the accidental strike on the Shajareh Tayyiba school on February 28, 2026, which killed at least 168 children and 14 teachers, according to Iranian state media.
The strike occurred on the first day of U.S. operations against Iran, as military officials and intelligence analysts scrambled to update targeting information for thousands of sites after President Donald Trump decided to launch combat operations. Analysts did not refresh all relevant records in the Pentagon’s databases before strikes began, leaving intelligence for many targets over 10 years old.
The targeting databases—the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB) and the Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-Repository System (MARS)—clearly indicated that information related to Iranian targets needed updating. An analyst had previously noted changes at the site in a separate digital tool, but that tool was not linked to the official intelligence database used for strike targets, and the information was never conveyed to military commanders.
The Pentagon has not released its investigation into the incident, months after the strike. A White House official said the investigation is ongoing. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has said the strike will be “thoroughly” investigated, adding that the U.S. has “attempted in every way possible to avoid civilian casualties.”
Multiple sources said senior Pentagon leaders pressed military officials to rapidly provide targets, straining CENTCOM and intelligence analysts. Another factor increasing risk was that Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response teams at CENTCOM were short-staffed due to Hegseth’s decision to cut the program earlier in his tenure, slashing staff by more than 90%.
